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RECENT CASES
Conflict of Laws-State Court's Power to Enjoin Suit in Foreign
State Court Under Employers' Liability Act-Tennessee state court
permanently enjoined resident of Tennessee from maintaining suit under
the Employers' Liability Act" in Missouri state court, in which jurisdiction
the employer was doing business, on the ground that the suit was oppressive.
Held (four justices dissenting), 2 the injunction violates the federal privi-
lege of venue created by the Act.3 Miles v. Illinois Central R. R., 62 Sup.
Ct. 827 (U. S. 1942).
A state, while it is not required to set up courts to hear suits on federal
causes of action, cannot, without violating the supremacy clause,4 discrim-
inatorily refuse to take jurisdiction over such suits when it already has a
court competent to hear them.5 Since Congress can create federal causes of
action which the states cannot decline to enforce, it can, when creating the
privilege of venue incidental thereto, make it absolute if it so chooses. The
Supreme Court in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner 7 held that the un-
qualified venue provision of the Employers' Liability Act creates a federal
privilege of venue in federal courts which is not subject to pre-existing
equitable doctrines (as contended by three dissenting justices), but is abso-
lute. Nothing was said in the Kepner case about venue in the state courts
which have concurrent jurisdiction under the Act; but if, under the statu-
tory language as interpreted by the Court, the plaintiff can "go shopping" s
for an out-of-state federal court free from home state injunctive interference,
under the very same language he can also freely go shopping for a foreign
state court. This is the extent of the decision which, as a matter of logic,
i. 35 STAT. 65 (I908), as amended 53 STAT. 1404 (939), 45 U. S. C. A. § 5,
(Supp. 1941).
2. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice
and Justices Roberts and Byrnes concurred. The majority opinion was delivered by
Mr. Justice Reed. Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a separate concurring opinion.
3. The Act provides: "Under this [Act] an action may be brought in a district
court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which
the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time
of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under
this [Act] shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States, and no
case arising under this [Act] and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction
shall be removed to any court of the United States." 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S.
C. A. § 56 (Supp. 1941).
4. U. S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
5. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230 (1934), with which compare
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 387 (929). Second Employ-
ers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I, 57 (1911) ; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (876).
6. The states remain free to regulate the local procedure of their courts provided
they do not discriminate against actions brought on federal causes of action. See in-
stant case at 831, 834.
Since federal courts can decline to exercise their jurisdiction on the ground of-
forum iton conwenie s (see Blair, Tiw Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-
Anerican Law (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV. i), a state court could presumably do so, at
least if the doctrine of fornm an convenienr has been adopted by that jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Reed seemed to imply in his opinion (at 830) that it could not. Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson refused to concur in that part of the majority opinion and expressed the
opinion that while another state may not interfere by injunction, the state where the
action is brought may refuse to exercise jurisdiction (provided such refusal be non-
discriminatory). Insofar as that dictum is concerned, Mr. Justice Reed's opinion is
only that of the minority of the court.
7. 314 U. S. 44 (1941), (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 489, (ig4i) 51 YALE L. J.
343.
8. Instant case at 831.
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is undoubtedly sound.0 It is, however, questionable that Congress intended
to make the privilege of venue absolute in either case. The Act is silent
on the point.10 Moreover the purpose of giving to the employee a choice
of courts where he might bring his action was to relieve him of the obvious
burden often entailed by having to sue at the employer's domicile.' It does
not follow that the employee should be allowed to use the venue provision
inequitably and to bring the action in an inconvenient forum far removed
from the place of the accident and from his own domicile. Congress cannot
be presumed to have intended to put the burden of great expense and incon-
venience on the employers at their injured employees' whim; rather it is
more reasonable to assume that such burden was intended to be imposed
only when that would be necessary to provide the employees with con-
venient forums near the place of the accident and near their home. In the
absence of more specific language the statute should not be interpreted as
sanctioning vexatious suits. Because the decision was close and because of
the strength of the vehement dissent, 2 it is possible that the case will be
challenged in the near future. However, even if the theory of absolute privi-
lege should ultimately be abandoned by the Supreme Court, the result in
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner could nevertheless stand on the ground
that a state court has no power to enjoin pending federal proceedings in
personarn.' 3 The present erroneous result would have been avoided if the
decision in the Kepner case had been placed on this older and less sweeping
theory. 14
9. See Note (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 714. 726-27, wherein it is argued that
state courts have enjoined proceedings brought under the F. E. L. A. in foreign state
courts while at the same time refusing to enjoin similar proceedings when brought in
out-of-state federal courts, and that their position is utterly illogical since if there is
a federal provilege of venue in the latter case it must follow that there is also one in
the former. The instant decision has the effect of repudiating these inconsistencies of
the state courts.
The lone justice who, after concurring in the majority opinion in the Kepner case
sided with the dissenters in the instant case, filed no separate opinion. Therefore the
reasoning which led to this surprising shift could only be guessed at.
io. See note 3 supra.
ii. See Baltimore & Ohio R. P. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 49 (I94I), (1942) 90
U. OF PA. L. REV. 489, (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 343.
12. "The decision in this case mutilates principles that have long been regarded as
basic in the law." Instant case at 833.
13. When the proceedings are proceedings i* ren or quai in rem priority of suit
determines the court's exclusive jurisdiction which can be protected by ancillary in-
junctions. Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U. S. 456 (1939). See Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922), for a case refusing to extend the doctrine to
actions in personam. For an ancillary injunction to issue when the proceedings are il
personam priority of judgment is indispensable. It would thus seem that federal pro-
ceedings in personam can be enjoined by a state court only when they are instituted to
relitigate issues previously adjudicated in a state court. Cf. Toucey v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 314 U. S. 118 (94), (1942) 9o U. OF PA. L. Ray. 857 (decided under
statute prohibiting issuance of federal injunctions against state proceedings). The his-
tory of the doctrine is outlined and the authorities gathered in Note, State Ijunictions
Against Proceedings in the Federal Courts (1942) go U. oF PA. L. Ray. 714, in which
a rationalization of the decisional law is attempted on the basis of a "constitutional
maximum of interference" between state and federal courts.
14. Abandonment of the doctrine of absolute privilege of venue (which is based
on an unfruitful search for Congressional intent) would bring about opposite results
when the action under the Act is brought in the federal court and when it is brought
in a state court. This, however, should not be startling for, as pointed out by the dis-
senting justices, at 833, "the problem of interferences, direct or indirect, between fed-
eral and state courts is entirely separate from the problem of the relations of the state
courts to each other." In the former problem (state and federal interference) the
courts involved are courts of two limited sovereigns which are not identical (as is the
case in the latter problem) but rather complementary and the territorial jurisdiction
of which is substantially co-extensive '(and not mutually exclusive as in the latter prob-
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Constitutional Law-Power of State Commission to Set Minimum
Price on Milk Sold to United States-Defendant sold milk to the
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation at a price below the minimum set by
the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission. The Commission therefore
refused defendant's application for a milk dealer's license. Defendant
appeals from this order on the ground that the Commission had no power
to fix the price of milk sold to the United States Government. Held (one
justice dissenting), that the Commission had such power under the Milk
Control Law,1 and that its exercise neither placed an unconstitutional
burden on the United States Government, nor interfered with its policy of
competitive bidding. Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 24 A.
(2d) 717 (Pa. 1942).
Control of prices in the milk industry is clearly within the police power
of the states since the public health is so directly affected.2 Fixing a mini-
mum price level prevents dealers from selling for low prices at the expense
of sanitary conditions. The extension of this power to include a United
States Army Camp may have once been unconstitutional, 8 but since the
liberal decision of the Supreme Court in Alabama v. King and Boozer 4 it
seems proper, although it may be an extension of the rule in that case. The
burden placed on the United States Government is only incidental to the
enforcement of state milk regulations; clearly the price of milk sold to the
Reservation is affected, but the exaction is not one which was expressly
made to discriminate against the Government. The burden, therefore, is
not unconstitutional under the King and Boozer case. Defendant argued
that the size of the order r (the largest ever made in Pennsylvania) enabled
him to make an even greater profit than he would have made on an equal
number of small sales at the minimum price, and therefore that he was
outside the purpose of the law-his standards of sanitation would not fall
because of the lowered price. Undoubtedly this was true, but the court
reached the more desirable result in refusing to except the Dairy from the
provisions of the Act; a strict, prophylactic rule is more advantageous to
the general public than one constantly open to interpretation. Violations
lem'). Moreover, there is in the state-federal situation a supreme arbiter to which
can be entrusted the enforcement of a reciprocal rule restricting to the strictly neces-
sary minimum the issuance of state-federal (or federal-state) injunctions. In the
state-state situation there is, with regard to non-federal matters, no such common court
of last resort. There self-restraint is the only limitation upon the issuance of injunc-
tions and, unless the doctrine-of the absolute privilege of venue be adhered to, this
should remain true when the suit pending in the courts of a sister state was brought
under the Employers' Liability Act. It is conceded, however, that, as a matter of
state internal law the greatest self-restraint should be exercised whenever an injunction
against proceedings in the courts of another state is iought.
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 194i) tit. 31, § 7ooj-Ioi.
.2. McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 366, io N. E. (2d) 139, 341 (1937).
3. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. *316, *427 (U. S. i8ig), Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall stated by way of dictum that the power to tax is the power to destroy. This
dictum 'was the prevailing doctrine for many years, and under it a burden less di-
rectly imposed on the Government than the one here involved would have clearly been
held unconstitutional. See also Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
which was similar to the case before us in that the constitutionality of a tax on a Gov-
ernment owned veterans hospital was involved.
4. 314 U. S. i (194), (i942) 40 MicHa. L. REv. 457. See also Graves v. New
York, 306 U. S. 4 66 (1939).
It should be noted that these cases, both of which were cited by the court, are tax
cases and therefore only analogous to the instant situation. They form no binding pre-
cedent
5. 135,000 one-quart bottles and 540,ooo half-pint bottles to be delivered between
March i and June 30, i941.
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are the natural consequences of exceptions. 6 However, the court was not
able to answer satisfactorily the contention that fixing a minimum price
interfered with the Government's policy of competitive bidding. This is
more than a policy; it is a statutory requirement 7 admitting to few excep-
tions,s of which this clearly is not one. The policy was initiated to give the
Government the benefits of competition. 9 Under the instant decision none
of these benefits will accrue; all bids will equal the minimum price, for
obviously no prospective seller would bid above it, and none is allowed to bid
below it. Thus the contracts may be let out on the basis of unjust favor-
itism or fraud. Perhaps the benefits to the Government in the maintenance
of sanitary conditions in the milk industry is greater than the benefit derived
from competitive bidding, but to say so is a legislative, not a judicial
function.' 0
Constitutional Law-State Jurisdiction over Foreign Banking
Corporation for Cause Arising Abroad as Unreasonable Burden on
Interstate-Foreign Commerce-In a New York court suit, brought
against Banque de France by New York residents, assignees of the Banque
National de Belgique, on a cause of action arising abroad, defendant sought
an order restraining New York courts from exercising jurisdiction, on the
ground that such jurisdiction constituted an unreasonable burden on inter-
state-foreign commerce and was therefore obnoxious to the "commerce
clause" of the Constitution." Held, New York courts had jurisdiction over
the defendant, 2 and their assertion of it cast no undue burden upon the
bank's performance of any function in interstate commerce incidental to its
business. In re Banque de France v. The Supreme Court of the State of
N. Y., 41 N. E. (2d) 65 (N. Y. 1942).
6. To quote the immortal words of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon,
249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928), this is a situation wherein it is advisable
to avoid the "'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions".
7. 31 STAT. 905 (igoi), io U. S. C. A. § 1201 (1928); 36 STAT. 861 (19IO), 4r
U. S. C. A. § 5 (1928) ; 37 STAT. 591 (1912) io U. S. C. A. § 12oo (1928); United
States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 6 F. (2d) 43, 68 (S. D. Calif. 1925); Schnei-
der v. United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 547 (1884); 38 Ops. AT'!Y-Grx. 555, 558 (U. S.
1937). The Schneider case is particularly strong because the court held competitive
bidding a necessary preliminary even to a modification of a contract. See United States
v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., iii F. (2d) 461, 463 (C. C. A. ioth, 194o) ; Lukens Steel
Co. v. Perkins, io7 F. (2d) 627, 639 (App. D. C. 1939).
8. Competitive bidding is not necessary in an emergency. For the definition of
what constitutes an emergency see Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 173. This and certain
other exceptions are found in the statutes cited note 7 supra.
9. See United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., Ii F. (2d) 461, 463 (C. C. A. ioth,
1940).
io. Only three prior cases have been found dealing with the precise problem of
controlling prices of milk sold to the Government. All have reached the same result
but none raised the problem of competitive bidding. See Milk Control Board v. Gos-
selin's Dairy, Inc., 301 Mass. 174, 16 N. E. (2d) 641 (1938), (1939) 23 MARQ. L. REV.
89 (concerning only the question of whether or not the regulation puts an unconstitu-
tional burden on the Government); Paterson Milk and Cream Co. v. Milk Control
Board, i18 N. J. L. 383, 192 AtI. 838 (1937) (citing no authority in support of its de-
cision) ; Commonwealth v. Rohrer, 37 Pa. D. & C. 410 (1937) (concerning only mat-
ters of jurisdiction). See also, Coho, Milk Price Control-A. Developing Field of Ad-
ninnistrative Law (1941) 45 Dicx. L. REv. 254, 265.
i. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
2. The Banque de France was the central bank of issue in France, and in the course
of its business maintained large bank balances in New York. Plaintiff obtained a
warrant of attachment against its property in that city, levied upon its accounts and
property held by the N. Y. Federal Reserve, and had a summons served by publication.
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The state court has jurisdiction in an action against a foreign corpora-
tion, brought by a resident who is assignee of a non-resident, on a transitory
cause of action arising outside the state." But such jurisdiction may not
be exercised, under the Constitution of the United States, when compulsion
of a foreign corporation, engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, to
submit to suit in the state would constitute an unreasonable burden on such
commerce. 4 This limitation, however, has been applied only in the case of
foreign corporations engaged in the transportation of passengers and
goods.5 The courts, in determining whether or not an unreasonable burden
on foreign and interstate commerce exists in such cases, have attempted to
balance the interests of individuals in the enforcement of private rights on
one side, against the interests of the public as a whole in untrammeled,
efficient interstate transportation on the other.6 In doing so, their decisions
have been controlled by three important factors: (i) where the cause of
action arose, (2) the residence of the plaintiff, and (3) whether the defend-
ant is operating in the state where sued.7 In only one reported case has a
non-carrier been heard to urge jurisdictional immunity on the basis of the
commerce clause," and "the doctrine of unreasonable burden" as a method
of challenging jurisdiction of state courts over foreign corporations will
probably never be extended to them.9 The social and economic justification
for the commerce clause limitation is the conviction that defendants should
not be subjected to harassments by suits brought in inconvenient forums
in order to capitalize on the nuisance value of the cost of defending the
action or in order to take advantage of the leniency of the particular court
selected. For this reason, application of the doctrine should not remain
indigenous to carriers, but should be extended to non-carriers as well, as a
3. "An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by a resident of the
state, or by a domestic corporation, for any cause of action." N. Y. CoNs. LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 24, § 224. Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Co.,
235 N. Y. 152, 139 N. E. 223 (1923).
4. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924); Davis v. Farmers'
Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312 (1923); Matter of Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Faw-
cett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936); Goomic, CoNFticr oF LAws (2d ed. 1938)
§ 76.
5. See note 4 supra. McGowan, Litigation as a Burden on Interstate Commerce
(1939) 33 ILL. L. Rzv. 875, 88o, 882. GOODmicH, CONFLICr oF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 76,
n. 225.
6. Cressy v. Erie Ry., 278 Mass. 284, 18o N. E. i6o (1932). In a footnote by the
court in Davis v. Farmers' Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U. /S. 312, 316 n. (1923), it was dis-
closed that in 67 of the 81 counties of Minnesota there were -pending in 1923 1,028
personal injury cases in which non-resident plaintiffs sought damages aggregating
nearly $26,oooooo from foreign railroads which did not operate any line within the
state.
7. Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Com-
?nerce (1933) 17 MINN. L. REV. 381, 386. The outermost limit of the principle that
jurisdiction should be refused because of interference with commerce was reached in
Bohn v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 22 F. Supp. 481 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). This case held that
a bona fide resident of New York at the time the cause of action arose and when it was
brought could not maintain his action in New York against a foreign corporation
operating a railroad in interstate commerce (but having no tracks in New York) on
a cause of action arising without that state. "In that case, I believe for the first time,
one who was a bona fide resident at the time of the accrual of the action, was barred
from maintaining an action in the state of his residence, though the court had acquired
jurisdiction. . . ." Weiss v. Southern Pac. Co., 173 Misc. 67o, 672, 18 N. Y. S. (2d)
86, 88 (N. Y. City Ct. I94O).
8. Trojan Engineering Corp. v. Green Mt. Power Corp., 293 Mass. 377, 2o0 N. E.
117 (1936). In this instance, the propriety of objection advanced by the defendant was
apparently assumed; the decision merely denied its applicability to the facts of the case
at issue.
9. GOODRicH, CoFLICr or LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 76, n. 225.
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shield against suits oppressive to the conduct of their interstate and foreign
commerce.' 0
Labor Law-Right of Pennsylvania State Labor Relations Board
to Appeal From Decree Setting Aside Its Order-On appeal by the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board from the lower court's decree setting
aside a reinstatement order it was held, that the Board, being a disinterested
party, had no right to appeal. Pensylvania Labor Relations Board v.
Hiinel Motors, Inc., 25 A. (2d) 306 (Pa. 1942).
Challenged by a statutory peculiarity offering no discomfort to other
courts,' the Pennsylvania judiciary took refuge in a technical interpretation
of the legislature's intent to deprive the Board of the right to appeal.2  To
decide otherwise, thought the court, would be tantamount to permitting the
Board to espouse the cause of labor-a most unorthodox procedure for an
impartial quasi-judicial body.8 This attitude not alone indicates a peculiar
impression as to the function of the Board, but more fundamentally seems to
undermine the validity of the entire State Labor Relations Act. Previously
the statute had been held constitutional on the theory that under the police
power it was in the state's interest to restore equality of bargaining power
by fostering union organization. 4 To overlook the fact that the Board, as
representative of the state, thereby has an individual interest entirely sepa-
rate and distinct from that of any particular labor union is to deny the
Board its very basis of existence. In addition the instant case goes to the
most unusual extreme by permitting the union or its interested members,
IO. Farrier, supra note 7, at 395; McGowan, mspra note 5, at 882. The court in
the instant case was no doubt restrained from considering an extension of the doctrine
to non-carriers because to grant such extension would relegate the plaintiffs, residents
of New York, wJiose title depends on decrees of the legitimate Government of Belgium,
to courts in France or Belgium dominated by Germany which refuses to recognize this
legitimate government, and they would thereby be effectively denied the right to liti-
gate in any tribunal their rights under this legitimate government.
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, §211.9 (a) provides that: "The juris-
diction of the court of common pleas shall be exclusive, and its judgment and decree
shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court on
appeal by either party, irrespective of the nature of the decree or judgment or the
amount involved." (Italics supplied.) The peculiarity consists of the wording which
provides appeal "by either party". Since three parties are involved, i. e., the Board,
the union and the employer, the court was concerned with the exact meaning of the
word "either".
Identical language is to be found in N. Y. STAT. ANN. (McKinney, 194o) Bk. 30,
Art. 20, § 707 (3) ; Rhode Island Acts and Resolves, Act of May 7, 1941, c. io66,
§ 8 (3).
The National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § i6o (e)
(Supp. 194), simply provides, however: "The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclu-
sive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to
review by the appropriate circuit court of appeals . . . and by the Supreme Court
of the United States upon writ of certiorari ... .
Utah Laws 1937, c. 55, § 18 (e) permits no right of appeal whatsoever, because the
action is brought in the supreme court, whereas Massachusetts Acts 1941, c. 261,
§ 6 (e) is similar to the National Labor Relations Act.
Wisconsin Laws 1939, c. 57, § 111.07 (7) and 102.25, does not involve the problem
at all because of its exact wording.
2. The court felt that since the words happened to differ from those used in the
National Labor Relations Act the Legislature must have intended something different.
Moreover, since the term "either party" was used elsewhere in the statute, where, by
its context, it could not include the Board within its meaning, the court thought that
the same sense should be attached when dealing with the question of appeal.
3. Instant case at 307.
4. United Retail Employees of America v. W. T. Grant Co., 341 Pa. 70, 17 A. (2d)
614 (1941).
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to appeal,5 thereby disregarding the well settled dogma that a labor rela-
tions act confers no private rights, merely public rights.6 Welcomed as
this development may be by strongly unified labor groups or parties claim-
ing through them,7 it affords scant encouragement to the infant labor body
which is unable to invoke the court's protection of his newly acquired rights.
So broad is the language of the court that it seems extremely unlikely that
the Board will be permitted even to defend itself if an appeal should be
taken by the employer. To suggest that the Legislature intended results
so contrary to all existing concepts of labor law when the Legislature itself
has shed no light is s to venture into speculative unrealities.
Labor Law-State's Right to Regulate Peaceful Picketing Under
Fourteenth Amendment-Carpenters union picketed place of busi-
ness of complainant restaurant operator,1 informing the public that the com-
plainant had made a contract with a building contractor who was unfair to
the union.2 Texas court enjoined the picketing as a violation of its anti-
trust statute.3 On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, held (four jus-
tices dissenting 4), injunction does not violate constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech,5 for states may define area of economic warfare. Car-
penters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe,6 IO U. S. L. WEEK
4293 (U. S. 1942).
Prior to this case peaceful picketing could be enjoined where previous
picketing was enmeshed in violence 7 but could not be enjoined solely
because there was no employer-employee relationship between the pickets
and those picketed.8 Here, no employer-employee relationship existed, and
there had been no violence; yet the peacful pickting was enjoined. This
the majority justified on the ground that the state had power in the interest
of its general welfare to define the limits of permissible economic warfare9
5. Instant case at 3o7.
6. 2 TE.LLER, LABOR DispuTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) § 368.
7. Strong labor groups have at times attempted to assert so-called private rights
as a hedge against any possible future lethargy on the part of Labor Relations Act ad-
ministrators. Moreover, creditors of employees who are to be reinstated with back
pay might be interested in asserting private rights as to the back pay.
8. No discussion of the problem appears in the Legislative Journals.
i. All the employees of the restaurant operator were members of the Hotel and
Restaurant Employee's Union, and they had no dispute with their employer. Nor did
the Carpenters' Union have any conflict with complainant as to his restaurant.
2. The contract was for the construction of a building, which construction was already
in progress. The site of the new building was a mile and a half from the site of the
restaurant, and there was no evidence of the purpose for which the new building was
going to be used. The contract gave the contractor the right to make his own arrange-
ments in the employing of labor.
3. For opinion of the Texas court, see 149 S. W. (2d) 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
For the statute construed, see TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1939) vol. 20, art.
7426, 7428.
4. Justice Frankfurter gave the majority opinion, which was concurred in by Jus-
tices Jackson, Byrnes, Roberts, and Chief Justice Stone. Justice Black gave a dissenting
opinion, which was concurred in by Justices Douglas and Murphy. Justice Reed gave
a separate dissenting opinion.
5. U. S. CoNsT. AIEND. XIV, § I.
6. Bitt cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, io U. S. L. WEE 4287 (U. S. 1942),
decided the same day as the instant case. Compare Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (i941).
7. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941).
8. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (I94I), 89 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 825. Note (1941) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 201.
9. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 363 (1921) ; Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195
U. S. 194, 205 (1904).
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and that the free speech aspect of peaceful picketing 10 did not preclude the
states from putting reasonable area restrictions on this economic weapon.
The dissenters found the injunction to be an unwarranted abridgment of
free speech under the Thornhill," Carlson," Swing,'8 and Wohl' 4 cases.3
Peaceful picketing may be considered solely as an effort to communicate
facts, and, therefore, purely a problem of free speech. Or peaceful picketing
may be construed fundamentally as an economic weapon, one of the elements
of which is free speech.'16 Then the problem is primarily that of the union-
employer economic- struggle. And in the struggle, the state, under the
instant case, has the function of referee. But since free speech is an
element of the picketing, and as such retains its claim to Constitutional pro-
tection, the Supreme Court has a ground on which it may check the referee,
at least with regard to the control of picketing. If this is a valid interpre-
tation of the majority opinion, then this case answers a question which the
Swing case conjured up, namely, whether the protection to be awarded to
peaceful picketing under the Fourteenth Amendment would preclude the
states from any regulation of that picketing..7  The Supreme Court herein
recognizes a substantive right of the states to control the economic weapon,
which necessarily admits regulation of free speech by the state to some
degree. In the instant case, the union caused economic loss to the "cus-
tomer" of the contractor in order to thereby force the "customer" to
endeavor to induce the contractor to hire union labor.' Perhaps picketing
the complainant was the only effective means by which the union could
enlist the aid of the public in its battle against the contractor.'9 Apparently
the court thought the union should fight its battle directly against its dispu-
tant and that the tactics here enjoined were indirect and also unfair to the
io. See Note (1941) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 201.
ii. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), I BiLL OF RIGHTS REV. 59. For
a discussion of non-labor peaceful picketing under the Thornhill case, consult Note
(1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 89.
12. Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. lo6 (1940).
13. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (94).
14. Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, io U. S. L. W=ax 4287 (U. S. 1942).
In this case a peddler bought baked goods from a manufacturer and sold them
to retailers. The peddler worked seven days a week. The union wished him to work
but six days a week and to hire a union driver to work the seventh day. The union,
to enlist the aid of the public to their cause, picketed two of the bakeries from which
the peddler bought his products. The New York courts enjoined the peaceful picket-
ing of either the bakeries or the retailers on the ground that there was no labor dis-
pute within the meaning of the state anti-injunction statute. The Supreme Court
reversed the New York Court of Appeals decree on the ground it was a denial of free
speech to the union regardless of whether there was a labor dispute under the terms of
the New York statute.
15. Justice Black in his dissent depended largely on the Thornhill case. Justice
Reed discussed all the four cases cited in the text and also discussed the Meadowznoor
case.
16. S~e concurring opinion of Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy in Bakery &
Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, IO U. S. L. WEEx 4287, 4288 (U. S. 1942).
17. See Note (1g41) 90 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 2O.
18. It may not be accurate to brand the restaurant owner as the customer of the
contractor. But there is somewhat of an analogy. It has been held that the union can
legally picket the customer of the disputant. Mason & Dixon Lines v. Odom, 3 C. C.
H. Labor Cases 11 60,942 (Ga. 1942); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union, 313 Ill. App. 24, 38 N. E. (2d) 972 (1942), with which compare, Goldfinger v.
Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, II N. E. (2d) 910 (I937), (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 547.
Compare Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247, I N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (Sup. Ct.
1937) with Davega-City Radio, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 246, I N. Y. S. (2d) 514
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
ig. The weapon is in reality no weapon if it results in nothing.
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complainant,20 even though the complainant's contract gave rise to the work
upon which the non-union activity was taking place.2' The Texas solution
did not seem unreasonable to the Supreme Court. But if picketing were
considered as nothing more than free speech, then the injunction could
hardly be justified, for the picketing was peaceful, the facts were truthfully
and accurately presented, and there was no previous violence nor fear of
future violence.
2
1
Labor Law-Union Exempt From Federal Anti-Racketeering
Act-United States indicted union fgr. violation of Federal Anti-
Racketeering Act, ' which provides that any person who extorts money
from another shall be guilty of a felony. Evidence showed that by force
and violence union stopped trucks entering New York City and compelled
payment of a day's wages to an extra man, member of union, whether he
drove and unloaded truck or merely stood by.2  Held (affirming Circuit
Court3), indictment dismissed.4 This is an ordinary activity of a labor
union which Congress intended to exempt from the Act as payment of
wages from a bona fide employer to a bona fide employee.5 United States v.
Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stable-
men and Helpers of America, io U. S. L. WEEK 4217 (1942).
The Federal Anti-Racketeering Act exempts from its terms unions
using threats and violence .olely to obtain more wages for employees, but
if a union compels payment of personal bribes, it is guilty of racketeering
within the Act.6 The main issue in the instant case concerned the status
of defendants as employees so that the truck owner's payments could be
considered wages. The majority, unconcerned with defendant's methods7
decided that where the offer to work is made in good faith and the employer
pays, even though only because of violent compulsion, the union man is an
employee and the payment to him is wages. Therefore, from the legislative
history of the Act,' Congress did not intend it to be invoked in such a
situation. The dissent points out that the criterion of guilt should not be
defendant's willingness to work, but rather the truck owner's purpose in
paying the money. Since the payments were made by the truck owners
solely to protect their trucks from harm, such payments cannot be termed
20. See dissenting opinion in People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206
(1941). See Smith, Coercion of Third Parties in Labor Disptes-The Secondary
Boycott (1939) I LA. L. Ray. 277.
21. To satisfy the claims of the union the complainant would probably have to
breach his contract with the contractor or else through a novation require the con-
tractor to hire union labor.
22. For a collection of cases relevant to the problems of the instant case, see FREY,
CASES oN LABOR LAw (3941) 120-148, 229-273.
1. 48 STAT. 976 (1934), i U. S. C. A. § 42oa-c (Supp. I94I).
2. Evidence was also introduced to show that in several instances union members
collected a day's pay without offering services at all. Instant case 4217.
3. The opinion of the Circuit Court is found at 118 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941). See (194) 2o N. C. L. REv. io4.
4. Chief Justice Stone dissented.
5. § 42oa states: "Any person who, . . . (a) Obtains or attempts to obtain, by
the use of or attempt to use or threat to use force, violence, or coercion, the payment
of money . . . not including, however, the payment of wages by a bona-fide em-
ployer to a bona-fide employee . . . (d) shall . . . be guilty of a felony.
6. Nick et al. v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 66o (C. C. A. 8th, 194), cert. denied,
62 Sup. Ct. 302 (1941).
7. "It is not our province either to approve or disapprove such tactics." Instant
case 4239.
8. The legislative history of the Act is carefully reviewed in the instant case at
4218.
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wages, regardless of defendant's state of mind. It is well settled that the
activities of members of labor unions, equally with private individuals, may
constitute racketeering and extortion.9 In the instant case the truck owners,
to avoid the threatened violence, had a choice of accepting the proffered
services and paying therefor, or of refusing the services and paying anyhow.
In either event the Court decided that the union man became an employee.
To hold that one whose services are neither needed nor desired and who
cannot be discharged 10 is an employee merely because he is a member of a
labor union is indeed giving to "employee" a novel definition. It is
extremely doubtful that Congress intended to clothe any group with such
a broad immunity.1 If defendant's activities were motivated by a bona
fide desire to secure employment for its members, such purpose is lawful,
and no fault can be found in attempting to secure such an end, provided
legitimate means are used. The means recognized by law are peaceful
picketing 1 2 and the strike 13 both of which are potent instruments of com-
pulsion. In the instant case, however, there was no pretext of using such
methods. The defendant resorted to the direct use of force which should
not be sanctioned by any court. Such activities are without doubt racket-
eering and the application of the Act should not be prevented by any fic-
titious definitions of "employee" and "wages", or any sympathy for the
thugs who were the defendants in this case.'
4
Negotiable Instruments-Liability of Drawee for Payments on
Checks Negligently Drawn to Deceased Payee-After beneficiary
B had died, trust company continued issuing checks to him as payee.
Despite the fact that they were returned with the indorsement "B by Mrs.
9. 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLEcTivE BARGAINING (1940) § 40. See Nick
et al. v. United States, 122 F. (2d) 66o, 669 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
io. The right of discharge is an important element in determining the existence of
a master-servant relationship. See Jones v. Goodson, 121 F. (2d) 176, 279 (C. C. A.
ioth, 194) ; Kentucky Cottage Industries v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 642, 644 (W. D. Ky.
1941).
II. "We all know perfectly well . . . that our Congress has never fallen so low
as to grant any element of the populace a right to commit highway robbery under any
pretext." Westbrook Pegler, Phila. Inquirer, April io, 1942, p. 25, col. 7.
12. The Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (932), 29 U. S. C. A. § ioi et seq.
(Supp. 1941), would preclude an injunction against picketing in this situation even
though no union member was actually employed by the truck owners. American Fed-
eration of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (194), 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 825. However,
even in this situation there would be a check on the violence of the methods used by
defendant, for under Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U. S. 287 (1941), 54 HARv. L. REv. io64, picketing can be enjoined if enmeshed in a
background of violence. No such check is suggested by the court in the instant case.
Picketing is not unlawful if the object is to force the employer to hire an extra man.
Cf. J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc., v. Fay, 26o N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 5o9 (1932) (employer
had contract with rival union and defendant union picketed to force him to employ one
of its members at each theatre and pay him the union rate of wages).
13. Had defendants used the strike to gain recognition of their objectives, there is
no doubt that there would have been no interference. Cf. Scott-Stafford Opera House
Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians' Ass'n, ii8 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. 1092 (1912). Perhaps
even the secondary strike could be used. I TELLER, op. cit. supra note 9, § 1o3.
14. Westbrook Pegler in a somewhat biased manner reduces the decision to the
following terms: "This court spins a long and complicated tissue of language the final
result of which is that if any five gorillas calling themselves a union stick you up as
you are delivering a crate of farm produce across a State line and give you your choice
of your money or your life they aren't racketeering or robbing you provided one of
them has the presence of mind to remark that in return for your money he would be
willing to drive your car a hundred yards. The mere utterance of this remark makes
him your employee." Phila. Inquirer, April 10, 1942, p. 25, col. 8.
974 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
B", twelve checks ' were issued before the trust company discovered that B
was dead. It then sought to charge the checks back to drawee bank on the
ground that B's interest in the trust ceased at death, and the unauthorized
indorsements were forgeries. Held, drawee not liable since in effect the
checks were payable to bearer which rendered immaterial the question of
forged indorsements. Darling Stores, Inc., v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co.,
156 S. W. (2d) 419 (Tenn. 1941).
Under Section 9 (3) of the N. I. L. an instrument "is payable to
bearer . . . when payable to the order of a fictitious 2 or non-existing
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable." '
Implicit in this statement is the hypothesis that a drawer who is ignorant
in fact of the non-existence of a named payee utters a non-negotiable instru-
ment, since it is neither payable to bearer, nor is there anyone capable of
making a genuine indorsement. Thus, where a check is drawn to the
order of a non-existing payee at the instance of a third person, the drawer,
if ignorant of the spurious nature of the payee, can recover from the drawee
who makes payment thereon.4 Similarly, the instant case involves a drawer
who was in fact ignorant of the payee's non-existence, but with the added
fact that his ignorance resulted entirely from his own negligence.5  In
evaluating the legal effect of drawer's negligence upon drawee's liability,
the court is troubled by the seeming discord between Section 9 (3) and
Section 61.6 That this latter section precludes the drawer from denying
the existence of a named payee in these situations has been vigorously
argued in denying drawee's liability.7  Its proponents justify this contention
on the ground that there can be no genuine indorsement in the case of a
spurious payee; and if the Section is to operate for the benefit of the holder
i. It is significant that attached to these checks were receipts to be executed by the
payee. These were marked "do not detach" in two places and in red ink. They were
obviously intended by the trust company as vouchers for their records. The receipts
were signed exactly like the checks.
2. For a discussion of the interpretation of the word "fictitious" see Kulp, The
Fictitious Payee (192o) 18 MICHr. L. R v. 296.
3. That this has been the American view, with the single exception of Kansas, is
stated with authority therefor in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw (6th ed.
1938) 223.
4. Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 2o2 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (1918) ; McCor-
nack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N. W. 542 (1926), (1927) 75 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 774; Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261, 185 Atl. 796 (1936),
(1937) 1 TEmP. L. Q. 269.
These cases may involve the interesting question as to whether knowledge by
the drawer must be actual, or whether it may be imputed from the third person. It
has been held that the knowledge of the drawer controls. See Seaboard Nat. Bank
v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26, 33, 85 N. E. 829, 831 (19o8). But this has been
imputed to the drawer where he employs another with a power of attorney to draw
checks. Semble, Snyder v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876 (19o8) ;
accord, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, i Cal. App. (2d) 694, 37
P. (2d) 483 (1934), (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 846. There may be a commercial prac-
tice whereby the person who actually inserts the payee's name is not the one who signs
as drawer. See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 207.
5. It has been held that failure to examine returned vouchers constitutes such neg-
ligence as will bar an action by the drawer. Osborn v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank,
218 Ill. App. 28 (1920).
6. NEGOTIABLE INsTRUmENTs LAW § 6I: "The drawer by drawing the instrument
admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse; and engages that
on due presentment the instrument will be accepted or paid, or both, according to its
tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly
taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who
may be compelled to pay it...
7. Cf. dissenting opinion in McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 854,
21H N. W. 551, 55 (1926).
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of such an instrument, it must do so without a genuine indorsement.8 On
the other hand, the majority view maintains that Section 61 was not
intended to operate in favor of the drawee,- and that he is not at all relieved
of his absolute duty to ascertain the validity of all indorsements.'0 Con-
fronted by these divergent views, and faced with a situation in which fac-
tually the drawer is clearly at fault, the instant court decides that drawer's
negligence removes the case from the authority of those decisions which
hold the drawee liable. To support this conclusion, two conflicting ration-
ales are advanced: that negligent ignorance of the payee's non-existence
may be treated under Section 9 (3)'as the equivalent of knowledge of his
non-existence, thus making it bearer paper; and, that drawer's negligence
estops him from denying "the existence of the payee and his then capacity
to endorse", thus making what would seem to be order paper. It appears
that this is an unnecessary distortion of the N. I. L. in order to justify a
desired result, especially since the decision might have been sustained easily
upon simpler grounds. A trustee who negligently represents as a fact that
beneficiary's wife may indorse and cash checks for the beneficiary, is
estopped to deny that fact when the bank acts in reliance thereon. This
ratio decidendi protects the drawee and at the same time obviates the neces-
sity of misapplying Sections 9 (3) and 61.
Taxation-Multiple State Taxation Upon Trust Fund When a
Life Beneficiary Exercises Power of Appointment-New York donee
owned a life share of a trust fund, created by a Massachusetts donor and
located in Massachusetts. By will the donee appointed his share to his
widow. The New York tax authorities in computing the tax upon the
transfer of the donee's estate included the amount of the trust fund share
which was passed by the power of appointment. Held, for tax commissioner,
the tax does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
mint. Graves v. Schnidlapp, io U. S. L. WEEK 4311 (U. S. 1942).
The instant case in overruling Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dough-
ton 1 is in accord with the present trend of double taxation of intangible
property.2 In the Wachovia case there was but one object of taxation rec-,
ognized -- the corpus of the foreign trust. The Court did not regard the
donee's life share and power of appointment as an interest subject to the
inheritance tax of the state of the donee. This caused a conflict as to which
8. Id. at 855, 211 N. W. at 552.
9. This argument is plausible when it is considered that § 6i refers specifically to
"holders" and "subsequent indorsers" and not to drawees. See note 6 supra.
io. For a consideration of the duty of a drawee see Jordan Marsh Co. v. Nat.
Shawmut Bank, 2oi Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 (igog) ; Shipman v. Bank of State of
New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (i891).
I. 272 U. S. 567 (1926). Donee of power of appointment over a trust created and
administered outside of North Carolina, the domicil of the donee, exercised the power
by will in that State. The corpus of the trust was in Massachusetts. A tax levied
under statute taxing transfers by power of appointment was upheld by the North Caro-
lina court. On appeal it was held that the tax was a taking of property without due
process, for the trust estate had no situs in North Carolina.
2. Brown, The Present Status of Multiple Taxatiom of Intangible Property (i942)
40 MicH. L. Rv. 8o6. For evidence of previous single tax policy see Brown, The Tax-
ation of Trust Property (1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 403, at 416-419. The Wachovid case
created much interest as a case establishing a single tax policy when the decision was
handed down. See (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 372; (1927) 40 HARv. L. RExv. 652;
(1927) 25 Micr. L. REv. 786; (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 716.
3. 272 U. S. 567, 575 (1926). "The exercise of the power of appointment was sub-
ject to the laws of Massachusetts and nothing relative thereto was done by permission
of the State where Mrs. Taylor [donee] happened to have her domicil."
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state might have jurisdiction to tax the corpus, the state of the trustee or of
the donee.4 The Court in the Wachovia case followed the common law
concept of the power of appointment 5 and reasoned that since the property
flowed from the creation of the donor, the state of the trustee should levy
the tax upon the transfer. However, the instant opinion considered the
power of appointment a taxable interest. 6 The decision evolved from Curry
v. McCanless 7 and Graves v. Elliott," in which the donors reserved a life
share and the power of appointment, and the state of the donor and the
state of the trustee both were considered as having jurisdiction to tax the
transfer of the property interest in the trust. When decided these cases did
not distinguish or overrule the Wachovia case 9 and thereby caused a
renewed interest in the jurisdictional problem. The present solution to the
taxation of the transfer minimizes the jurisdictional problem by recognizing
that there are separate and distinct taxable interests in the state of the donee
and the state of the trustee.10 Such a result is not looked upon as uncon-
stitutional, but the question arises as to whether it is economically wise to
burden this specific type of legal device, the trust, in this manner. This
consideration is a matter of policy." The current judicial policy is appar-
ently one which approves of imposing upon this type of trust transaction
the burden of two transfer taxes.'2
4. For discussion of the jurisdictional problem under a single tax policy see Mul-
ford, The Conflict of Laws and Powers of Appointment (1939) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv.
403; Note (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 39, 46.
5. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 333, comment a; i SImES, FuTuRE INTERESTS
(1936) §§ 253, 254.
6. The Court cited Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (1916); Whitney v. Tax
Commissioner, 309 U. S. 530 (1940). The New York statute, N. Y. CoNs. LAws
(Cahill, 193o) c. 61, § 249-R (7), stated that the gross estate was determined by all
property wherever situated, ". . . (7) To the extent of any property passing under
a general power of appointment exercised by the dee dent (a) by will. . . !n For
a discussion of the tax consideration see Thompson, Inheritance Taxation and Powers
of Appointment (1939) Wis. L. Rm. 255.
7. 307 U. S. 357 (1939). Mr. Justice Stone wrote the majority opinion, and Mr.
Justice Butler wrote the dissent, with Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice McReyn-
olds and Mr. Justice Roberts joining in the dissent.
8. 307 U. S. 383 (1939). Same division of the Court as cited note 7 mtPra, with
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes writing the dissenting opinion.
9. Curry v. McCanless, 3o7 U. S. 357, 371 (939).
io. Foley, S., in an earlier consideration of the instant case, 172 Misc. 426 (Surr.
Ct. 1939), based his decision upon the theory that the exercise of the power of appoint-
ment by the donee is not a taxable interest and if New York did levy a tax on the
transfer it would be doing so in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
ii. See Brown, note 2 supra, 4o MicH. L. Rav. 8o6.
12. 1O U. S. L. WEEK 4311, at 4312 (U. S. 1942). "There is no reason why the
state should continue to be deprived of revenue from a subject which since the begin-
ning has been within the reach of its taxing power; a subject over which we cannot
say the state's control has been curtailed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
